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Accounting for Ambiguity and Trust in Partial Outsourcing: 
A Behavioral Real Options Perspective 
 
Yongling Gaoa and Tarik Driouchib 
aCentral University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China 
bKing’s College London, University of London, London, UK 
 
Concerned with the hidden costs of outsourcing, this paper examines the role of ambiguity and trust in partial 
outsourcing decisions from the perspective of real options theory. We study pricing and quantity dynamics 
between an ambiguity averse vendor and a less (more) trusting client in a leader-follower framework with 
fixed timing. We find that the client’s partial outsourcing quantity increases with the vendor’s ambiguity if 
outsourcing is meant for cost-saving purposes. The effect of trust on outsourcing quantity, meanwhile, is 
jointly moderated by the vendor’s ambiguity and quality of shared information forecasts when cost advantages 
are exaggerated. In terms of pricing effects, the vendor increases (decreases) her threshold with increasing 
ambiguity for long-term (short-term) contracts. These insights hold under the multiple-priors and worst-case 
ambiguity specification. When Choquet ambiguity and rank-dependent utility are considered, more complex 
and subtle dynamics are obtained. Ambiguity has additional non-linear effects on outsourcing quantity due to 
heterogeneity in ambiguity preferences (seeking vs. aversion) and probability weighting. The vendor’s price 
not only increases (decreases) with increasing ambiguity-seeking for long-term (short-term) contracts, but also 
with ambiguity aversion when specific risk-return ratio conditions are met. Trust effects are qualitatively 
similar under both ambiguity specifications.  
 
Keywords: partial outsourcing; cost uncertainty; real options; trust; multiple-priors ambiguity; Choquet ambiguity  
 
Introduction 
Partial outsourcing is prevalent in many industries. Most manufacturers outsource their operations to 
some degree subject to changes in business and economic conditions. Samsung, for example, is known to 
manufacture its products in-house but also outsources some of its production processes whenever necessary. 
Toyota outsources 70% of the components of its vehicles and keeps 30% in-house to improve innovation (Xiao 
and Gaimon, 2013). According to Capgemini (2014), 72% of 3PL users have increased their reliance on 
outsourced logistics services either as a whole or in terms of individual activities, while several shippers source 
most, if not all, of their logistics activities. E-commerce companies like Amazon have their own fleet of trucks 
but also use traditional carriers such as FedEx and UPS to speed up product delivery and control shipping 
expenses.  
While the above suggests that partial outsourcing has become second nature in manufacturing and services, 
stories about outsourcing failure are not uncommon (Barthelemy, 2003; Cabral et al., 2014).1 Reasons behind 
                                                             
1 Reports in the popular press (e.g., Forbes, IndustryWeek, Businessweek, CIO magazine, Computerworld) indicate that major 
companies such as IBM, JP Morgan Chase, EDS, Royal Bank of Scotland, Boeing, Accenture and Virgin Airlines have all 
experienced some kind of outsourcing failure in recent years. 
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such failures have been attributed to a mismatch in expectations between clients and vendors, unexpected and 
hidden operating costs, poor governance systems and cultural differences (Forbes, 2013; Larsen et al., 2013; 
Cabral et al., 2014). Several surveys of executives (Barthelemy, 2003; Benlian and Hess, 2011) especially 
highlight how most outsourcing programmes fail to meet their cost-saving targets because of unexpected and 
consistently increasing operating costs, lack of information clarity about outsourcing implementation, and 
fragile risk mitigation policies. This double-sided form of cost uncertainty together with information 
incompleteness and suboptimal behavior - as other hidden costs of outsourcing - creates ambiguity in the 
outsourcing process. Ambiguity also arises from external factors because of the increasingly complex and 
turbulent business environments firms (i.e., vendors and clients) find themselves operating in (Sargut and 
McGrath, 2011). Wages in several outsourcing hubs have more than doubled since 2008. Industrial and 
agricultural raw material prices have become more volatile (Boute and Van Mieghem, 2015). Exchange rates 
and shipping costs across the globe are also shifting frequently because of numerous structural economic 
changes. This renders the task of accurately predicting future costs and effectively managing outsourcing 
operations extremely difficult and uncertain for vendors. This, in turn, exacerbates the negative effects of cost-
related uncertainty on outsourcing performance and increases the hidden costs of outsourcing. Another 
important source of uncertainty relates to the quality of outsourcing services, the degree of trust between 
clients and vendors, and the reliability of outsourcing providers (Zuñiga and Martinez, 2016; Drauz, 2016).  
In such an ambiguous state of affairs and with the increasing rate of failure surrounding outsourcing, 
determining the right price and quantity of (partial) outsourcing is becoming a critical and especially 
challenging task for vendors (contract-receiving firms) and clients (contract-granting firms). In this paper, we 
examine the issue of the hidden costs of outsourcing, and its pricing and quantity implications, from an 
ambiguity perspective using real options theory. We are interested in the cost-saving and volume-based 
learning effects of partial outsourcing on pricing and quantity dynamics in a dyad consisting of an ambiguity 
averse vendor and a less (more) trusting client. Because of her perceived specialization, the vendor (she), 
while uncertain about her own future operating costs, makes positive forecasts about the cost-saving benefits 
associated with outsourcing. To clinch a bigger contract, she exaggerates the client’s in-house variable costs 
and communicates this exaggerated information to the client. The client (he), faced with incomplete 
information, becomes doubtful and less confident about the forecasts and decides whether and to which extent 
he should trust the vendor. As such, the client’s degree of trust towards the vendor’s forecasts and the vendor’s 
uncertainty or degree of ambiguity about the costs of outsourcing are fundamental to the outsourcing 
arrangement.  
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This paper proposes a behavioral real option model with trust for quantity and price under ambiguity that 
enables us to better understand some of the hidden costs of outsourcing, their consequences and the nature of 
outsourcing relationships in practice. Specifically, our ambiguity-based modeling provides insights into how 
unexpected costs, expectations’ mismatch and suboptimal/subjective behavior affect partial outsourcing 
decisions and their outcomes. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we address the problem of the 
hidden costs of outsourcing by unveiling the joint effects of ambiguity and trust on price and quantity 
dynamics in outsourcing decision making. Second, we compare and contrast these effects under the multiple-
priors and Choquet ambiguity specifications using real options theory, thus introducing notions of cognition 
and subjective behavior to the real options literature concerned with outsourcing (e.g., Antelo and Bru, 2010, 
Li and Wang, 2010).  
As a real option, outsourcing has the potential to lower costs, increase flexibility and enhance firm value 
(Choi et al., 2017). However, this might be at the expense of innovation, service quality and tacit know-how 
(Kenyon et al., 2016). In Xiao and Gainmon (2013), for example, future value is defined as a power learning 
function of an in-house production quantity that captures the incremental benefits of keeping manufacturing 
in-house. At the same time, the client can also learn from the vendor’s tacit knowledge through outsourcing 
(Gupta and Polonsky, 2014; Aubert et al., 2015). This learning effect is empirically highlighted by Kroes and 
Ghosh (2010) but has not received enough attention in normative outsourcing decision models. The trade-offs 
between the future value of in-house operations and that of outsourcing for the client - and their influence on 
outsourcing pricing and quantity decisions - are also studied in our paper using our ambiguity-based real 
options approach with trust. This is the first research to examine the partial outsourcing real option problem 
and the issue of the hidden costs of outsourcing from the perspective of behavioral theory (see e.g., Agliardi 
et al., 2016; Leiblein et al., 2017 and their behavioral valuation models) while considering ambiguity and trust 
jointly. Our behavioral real options model of partial outsourcing captures a number of features neglected in 
the existing literature: vendor’s ambiguity, client (dis)trust, and volume-based learning from in-house 
production and outsourced operations. Allowing for ambiguity in such a setting is important because it enables 
us to shed light on the role of subjective/suboptimal behavior in outsourcing relationships, account for 
unexpected cost uncertainty and lack of information clarity in outsourcing provision, and understand some of 
the antecedents of outsourcing failure.  
In our fixed timing setting (see e.g., Agliardi and Koussis, 2011), the client acts as a leader in the sense 
that he controls the outsourcing quantity and timing while the vendor is a follower who sets her pricing 
conditions. We model ambiguity using the multiple-priors ambiguity specification or so-called “worst-case” 
4 
 
ambiguity aversion heuristic2, addressing the following practical questions: What is the client's outsourcing 
quantity with and without trust? How to determine the outsourcing price and quantity of outsourcing under 
ambiguity when accounting for cost-savings and future learning benefits? How do trust and ambiguity 
(preferences) affect partial outsourcing outcomes? 
We find that higher ambiguity from the vendor increases the client’s outsourcing quantity when the cost-
saving index is positive but does not necessarily increase the vendor’s lowest offer price. The vendor’s price 
increases (decreases) with ambiguity for long-term (short-term) contracts. Trust affects the partial outsourcing 
quantity in a non-monotonic way as a result of joint moderating effects from ambiguity and information 
sharing quality. Most of these dynamics are altered under Choquet ambiguity and rank-dependent utility when 
ambiguity preferences (seeking vs. aversion) and probabilistic sophistication come into play. The effects of 
ambiguity on outsourcing quantity are exacerbated by heterogeneity in ambiguity preferences and the vendor’s 
price is found to not only increase (decrease) with ambiguity-seeking for long-term (short-term) contracts, but 
also with ambiguity aversion when specific risk-return ratio dynamics are met. Trust effects are maintained 
under rank-dependent utility. These findings are able to explain over-commitment and short-termism biases 
in outsourcing, provide guidance on how clients and vendors behave when faced with incomplete and 
asymmetric information, and point to the need to embed flexibility/performance clauses in outsourcing 
contracts and sequence commitment into contingent stages as ways of dealing with ambiguity and mitigating 
some of the hidden costs of outsourcing.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some relevant literature concerned with real 
options and outsourcing. In Section 2, we investigate the vendor’s outsourcing pricing strategy and the client’s 
outsourcing quantity decisions. The effects of ambiguity and trust on outsourcing outcomes are discussed in 
Section 3. The final section concludes with a summary of findings and research implications. A list of notations 
and all proofs are covered in the Appendix. 
1. Related literature  
There is substantial research on how real options affect outsourcing decisions in the presence of 
irreversibility and uncertainty. Real options theory has been applied to the analysis of clients’ outsourcing 
strategies in a number of economic settings and contractual frameworks (e.g., Nembhard et al., 2005; Alvarez 
and Stenbacka, 2007; Liu and Nagurney, 2011; Benaroch et al., 2012). These studies have provided a deeper 
understanding of clients’ managerial flexibility in outsourcing when faced with international risk and demand 
                                                             
2 For comparison, Table 2 revisits our modeling from the perspectives of 1) Choquet ambiguity and 2) risk without ambiguity. 
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and cost uncertainty. Different from this stream of literature, Jiang et al. (2008), Jiang et al. (2010), Moon et 
al. (2011) and Shi and Feng (2016) have recently emphasized the role of vendors in setting outsourcing 
contracts and described how real options valuation for outsourcing can diverge if viewed from the vendor’s 
perspective. Little attention has been paid, however, to how subjective behavior and behavioral uncertainty 
affect option-based outsourcing outcomes. The decision variables in the above and other related articles are 
summarized and compared in Table 1. Most of the existing literature quantifies outsourcing outcomes based 
on exogenously determined outsourcing prices or quantities.3 Also, all the aforementioned real options studies 
share a common assumption that the distribution of uncertain factors is perfectly known (risk) to the client or 
vendor. The impact of ambiguity, as uncertainty beyond risk, on vendors’ and clients’ outsourcing decisions 
remains unclear and under-researched. Accounting for ambiguity in outsourcing is empirically relevant 
because of the hidden costs associated with outsourcing, lack of information clarity about vendors’ outsourcing 
provision and operating costs, vagueness in contractual relationships, and the high economic uncertainty in 
business environments. Recent qualitative empirical research also calls attention to the role of uncertainty, 
cognition and behavioral biases in outsourcing decisions (Musteen, 2016).  
In this paper, we rely on the multiple-priors ambiguity specification, considering 𝜅-ignorance with the 
worst-case decision rule, to elucidate how ambiguity affects outsourcing price and quantity dynamics.4 The 
ambiguity studied herein concerns the costs associated with outsourcing and relates to hidden and unexpected 
costs. For comparison, we also study the effect of Choquet ambiguity or rank-dependent utility (see e.g., 
Agliardi and Serono, 2011; Kast et al., 2014; Driouchi et al., 2015), proxied by 𝑐-ignorance5, on outsourcing 
outcomes in Section 3. The multiple-priors specification considers worst-case decision-making and appraisal 
whereas the Choquet framework accounts for probabilistic sophistication and probability weighting under 
ambiguity aversion and seeking. While studying multiple-priors ambiguity should be more suitable for 
situations where vendors feel less competent and less confident about performing new or untested/unknown 
outsourcing tasks (i.e., akin to Ellsberg “unknown” urns), Choquet-based analysis should fit cases of more 
confident vendors with more relevant outsourcing expertise and experience.  
 
                                                             
3 Our paper is also related to recent real options research on revenue sharing (e.g., Shibata and Nishihara, 2011; Banerjee et 
al., 2014). 
4 Several papers have recently studied real options in the context of ambiguity averse decision makers, including Nishimura 
and Ozaki (2007), Trojanowska and Kort (2010), Asano (2010), Miao and Wang (2011) and Gao and Driouchi (2013). 
5 See detailed discussions in Agliardi and Sereno (2011), Kast and Lapied (2010) and Kast et al. (2014). Compared with 
multiple-priors ambiguity (e.g., Chen and Epstein, 2002; Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007), Choquet utility allows for different 
attitudes towards ambiguity, probability weighting and meets the dynamic consistency requirement of real options analysis.  
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Table 1. Real options in outsourcing  
Citation 
Uncertainty 
type 
Client decision variables 
Vendor decision 
variables 
Considering trust 
or volume-based 
learning  
Nembhard et al. 
(2003) 
Risk Outsourcing timing - No 
Nembhard et al. 
(2005) 
Risk Option implementation  No 
Alvarez and 
Stenbacka (2007) 
Risk Outsourcing proportion - No 
Jiang et al. (2008)  Risk - 
Outsourcing 
timing 
No 
Yao et al. (2010)  Risk Outsourcing price and timing - No 
Jiang et al. (2010)  Risk  
Outsourcing 
timing 
No 
Antelo and Bru 
(2010) 
Risk Restructuring or outsourcing - No 
Li and Wang (2010) Risk Production quantities Capacity No 
Moon et al. (2011) Risk - 
Outsourcing 
timing 
No 
Benaroch et al. 
(2012) 
 
Risk 
 
The probability and timing of 
switching 
- 
 
No 
 
Moretto and Rossini 
(2012) 
Risk 
Outsourcing timing, proportion 
and capacity 
- No 
Liu and Nagurney 
(2013) 
Risk 
Sales, outsourcing and fast-
response production quantities  
- No 
Shi and Feng (2016) Risk - 
Outsourcing 
timing 
No 
Shi (2016) Risk - 
Entry and exit 
timing 
No 
This paper 
Risk and 
ambiguity 
Outsourcing quantity  Outsourcing price Yes 
 
Besides the significance of ambiguity in buyer-seller relationships (see e.g., Hazen et al., 2011; Gao et al., 
2018), trust is also considered a key factor in outsourcing but it is rarely studied in extant real options research. 
As explained by McEvily (2011), it is more realistic and appropriate to combine uncertainty and trust when 
explaining decision-making behavior than focus on only one or the other. Prior literature highlights the 
importance of manufacturers’ demand forecast information sharing and its influence on suppliers’ capacity 
decisions. Özer et al. (2011) pioneer the analytical trust-embedded model for capacity investment decisions 
and demonstrate that a continuum exists between absolute trust and complete distrust. Özer et al. (2014) further 
confirm the existence of this continuum between supply chain members from China and those of the United 
States in an experimental setting. Ebrahim-Khanjari et al. (2012) use trust to evaluate a retailer’s optimal order 
quantity when a sales-person shares information forecasts on behalf of a manufacturer. They find that trust 
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alters standard optimality conditions. Similarly, Pezeshki et al. (2013) use trust to filter retailers’ forecasted 
demand in divergent supply chains and establish a significant link between trust and financial performance. 
These studies focus on forecast information sharing from a demand perspective. We address the issue of trust 
in cost information sharing from the client’s viewpoint and consider ambiguity in the vendor’s variable costs 
(i.e., accounting for unexpected and hidden costs). We define trust as the client’s willingness to adopt the 
vendor’s forecast report when she evaluates his in-house variable costs. Our behavioral real options framework 
determines the vendor’s lowest offer price for a given outsourcing timing and the client’s corresponding 
outsourcing quantity, and offers several new insights into the effects of ambiguity and trust on partial 
outsourcing decisions.  
2. Partial outsourcing under ambiguity and trust 
2.1. Model formulation and problem description 
Consider a two-tier supply chain with a vendor and client. The client’s total demand is denoted by 𝑄. It 
consists of outsourcing quantity 𝑞 and in-house operation quantity 𝑄− 𝑞. The vendor’s and client’s fixed 
costs are represented by 𝐼  and 𝑀, respectively. The contract duration is 𝐷. Let (Ω, ℱ𝑇, 𝑃) denote a 
probability space and (𝐵𝑡)0≤𝑡≤𝑇  represent a standard geometric Brownian motion with respect to 𝑃. The 
benchmark dynamics of the vendor’s variable cost 𝑋(𝑡) follow 𝑑𝑋(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡, where 𝜇 
and 𝜎  are the growth rate and volatility, respectively. Because of uncertainty in cost expectations, this 
lognormal diffusion process gets distorted when accounting for the vendor’s ambiguity and cognition in our 
outsourcing setting (see Assumption 1). Other notations are summarized in Table A1 in Appendix A. The 
following assumptions apply. 
Assumption 1. Ambiguity in the vendor’s variable cost is characterized by the set of probability measures 
𝒫 = {𝑄𝑉
𝜃|𝜃 ∈ Θ}, where (𝜃)0≤𝑡≤𝑇 ∈ Θ satisfies Novikov’s condition, 𝑄𝑉
𝜃  is equivalent to 𝑃, Θ is a set of 
density generators, Θ = [−𝜅, 𝜅], 𝜅 is a constant used to limit the scope of 𝜃, 𝜅 ≥ 0. This form of ambiguity 
is known as 𝜅-ignorance in the multiple-priors ambiguity framework (see e.g., Chen and Epstein, 2002). It 
implies that the vendor is uncertain about the drift of the Brownian motion driving her costs function 𝑋(𝑡) 
and that there are unexpected outsourcing costs.  𝜅-ignorance further reflects the degree of “contamination” 
of the vendor’s confidence (see e.g., Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007) about her future variable costs and her 
subjective/behavioral deviations from the benchmark probability. We use the following multiple-priors-based 
Brownian motion formulation to capture ambiguity in the vendor’s variable costs (see also Nishimura and 
Ozaki, 2007; Cheng and Riedel, 2013):                          
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𝑑𝑋(𝑡) = (𝜇 − 𝜎𝜃𝑡)𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝜃                                                   (1) 
where 𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝜃 = 𝑑𝐵𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝑑𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] based on Girsanov’s theorem, 𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝜃  is a Brownian motion with 
respect to 𝑄𝑉
𝜃, the drift or growth rate is subjectively evaluated as 𝜇 − 𝜎𝜃𝑡 because of the vendor’s ambiguity. 
𝜃 is restricted to Θ = [−𝜅, 𝜅]. A greater 𝜅 means the vendor is less confident and more ambiguity averse 
about the growth rate and considers a range of possible drifts under uncertainty (Cheng and Riedel, 2013). Eq. 
(1) hence aims to also reflect the unexpected or additional costs to be incurred by the ambiguity prone vendor. 
Behavioral adjustment factor 𝜎𝜃𝑡 accounts for her ambiguity aversion/pessimism and subjective deviations 
from the benchmark cost specification. This subjective factor can help prepare for worst-case eventualities 
and aid in avoiding the winner’s curse in outsourcing (see e.g., Kern et al., 2002; Jiang et al., 2010). 
The worst case of the vendor’s cost 𝑋(𝑡) over [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐷] can be obtained using the maxmin expected 
utility as follows (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007; Asano, 2010; Trojanowska and Kort, 2010):  
                         𝑊(𝑡) = sup
𝜃∈[−𝜅,𝜅]
𝐸𝑡
𝑄𝑉
𝜃
[∫ 𝑋(𝜏)𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝑑𝜏
𝑡+𝐷
𝑡
|ℱ𝑡] = 𝜆𝑋(𝑡)                                                       (2)  
where 𝑟 is the discount rate, the ambiguity multiplier 𝜆 = 1−𝑒
−ℎ𝐷
ℎ
，ℎ = 𝑟 − 𝜇 − 𝜅𝜎 ≪ 1.  
From Eq. (2), Eq. (1) can be rewritten as: 
𝑑𝑊(𝑡) = (𝜇 − 𝜎𝜃𝑡)𝑊(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑊(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝜃                                                 (3) 
Sharing forecast information is a common practice in global supply chains. Clients need accurate cost 
forecasts to plan their future operations (see also Yan and Ghose, 2010), including those potentially related to 
outsourcing. Outsourcing vendors can also share their cost forecasts with clients. For example, the vendor 
could deliver her forecast about the client’s variable costs. However, it is also well known that vendors usually 
inflate clients’ in-house operation costs to highlight their own cost advantages. Consequently, trust plays a key 
role in deciding the client’s order policy and position vis-à-vis the vendor. It is observed that there is a 
continuum between complete trust and no trust (Özer et al., 2011). This is reflected in Assumption 2. 
Assumption 2. The client communicates with the vendor via cheap talk. He is faced with two forecast 
values for his in-house costs: his own judgment 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡) = 𝐴 + 𝜌𝐼𝐻𝑊(𝑡) and the vendor’s report  𝑊𝑉(𝑡) =
𝜌𝑉𝑊(𝑡) (see e.g., Yao et al., 2009). Here 𝐴 denotes the fixed component of 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡) that does not need to 
be forecasted. 𝜌𝐼𝐻𝑊(𝑡) represents the dynamic part of 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡) that could also be associated with the state 
of the economy (see e.g., Pindyck, 1993). 𝜌𝐼𝐻 (𝜌𝑉) denotes the ratio of the client’s forecast (vendor’s report) 
to the vendor’s variable cost. If 𝜌𝑉 is greater (smaller) than 1, the vendor claims (communicates) that she has 
a variable cost advantage (disadvantage) over the client. The client’s trust-embedded forecast about his in-
house variable cost 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡) is as follows: 
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𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡) = 𝛿𝑊𝑉(𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡)                                                      (4) 
where 𝛿 is the trust factor,6 𝛿 ∈ [0,1]. If 𝛿 = 1 (𝛿 = 0), the client completely trusts (distrusts) the vendor’s 
forecast report.  
Rearranging Eq. (4), we get: 
𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡) = 𝛿𝜌𝑉𝑊(𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)(𝐴 + 𝜌𝐼𝐻𝑊(𝑡)) = (1 − 𝛿)𝐴 + 𝜌(𝛿)𝑊(𝑡)                         (5) 
where the weighted ratio 𝜌(𝛿) = 𝛿𝜌𝑉 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜌𝐼𝐻. 
Besides cost-saving considerations, the client has an opportunity to learn from the vendor and acquire 
new knowledge through outsourcing. Meanwhile, the client can also transfer his in-house production expertise 
for innovation. To capture such effects, we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 3. The client’s volume-learning effects derived from outsourcing and in-house operations are: 
∫ 𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞𝜉𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝑑𝜏 = 𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞𝜉
𝑡+𝐷
𝑡
 and ∫ 𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄−𝑞)
𝛾
𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝑑𝜏 = 𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄− 𝑞)
𝛾𝑡+𝐷
𝑡
, respectively. Here 𝜑 is 
the present value multiplier 𝜑 =
1−𝑒−𝑟𝐷
𝑟
. 𝜉 and 𝛾 denote decreasing returns from learning benefits, 𝜉, 𝛾 ∈
(0,1). 𝑓𝑂𝐻 and 𝑓𝐼𝐻 are scaling factors for volume-learning from outsourcing and in-house operations, 𝑓𝑂𝐻 ≥
0, 𝑓𝐼𝐻 ≥ 0.  
The power functions in Assumption 3 take similar forms as the future value function in Xiao and Gainmon 
(2013) but differ in considering contract duration and the volume-based learning benefits of outsourcing. The 
client’s volume-based learning effects due to in-house production and outsourcing reflect how volume-based 
knowledge can improve products and services, and create value through in-house production or partial 
outsourcing (Aubert et al., 2015).  
2.2. The vendor’s pricing and the client’s outsourcing quantity decisions 
The client aims to start outsourcing immediately and announces the outsourcing timing 𝑡0. From this, the 
vendor determines the outsourcing price and provides her forecast report. The client filters the vendor’s report 
and optimizes his outsourcing quantity 𝑞. Given the outsourcing timing 𝑡0, the client gives up the pricing 
rights to the vendor and only determines his outsourcing quantity.  
                                                             
6 A recent stream of research concerned with demand forecast sharing (e.g., Ebrahim-Khanjari et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2017) 
updates the trust factor using information mismatch criteria. Following these studies, let ∆ denote the relative distance 
between the vendor’s report 𝜌𝑉𝑊(𝑡) and the client’s benchmark report  ?̂?𝑉𝑊(𝑡), where ∆= (𝜌𝑉 − ?̂?𝑉) ?̂?𝑉⁄ , ?̂?𝑉 proxies 
for the client’s standard assessment of 𝜌𝑉. 𝛿 = 𝛿(𝑎, 𝑏, ∆) is the trust factor function with updating, 𝑎 denotes the trust 
factor without updating based on information sharing levels, reputation, prior experience, network position etc. (Chang et al., 
2014; Schoenherr et al., 2015), and 𝑏 indicates the client’s sensitivity to ∆. As ambiguity 𝜅  does not appear in 𝛿 =
𝛿(𝑎, 𝑏, ∆), using this trust function does not alter our main conclusions. Therefore, and for ease of exposition, we follow Özer 
et al. (2011) and do not account for the determinants of trust in our fixed timing setting.  
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The vendor uses real option rules to evaluate whether to accept the outsourcing contract or not. She 
maximizes her utility as follows: 
𝐹(𝑊(𝑡)) = max
𝑡′≥𝑡
{min [∫ (𝑝𝑞 − 𝑞𝐼 − 𝑋(𝜏)𝑞)𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝑑𝜏|ℱ𝑡
𝑡′+𝐷
𝑡′
]}                              (6) 
The vendor chooses between committing to the outsourcing contract at time t or postponing exercise. 
This can be expressed as: 
𝐹(𝑊(𝑡)) = max {𝑝𝜑𝑞 − 𝐼𝜑𝑞 −𝑊(𝑡)𝑞, min
𝜃∈[−𝜅,𝜅]
𝛦𝑄
𝜃
[𝑑𝐹|ℱ𝑡] + 𝐹 − 𝑟𝐹𝑑𝑡}                         (7) 
After solving a standard optimal stopping problem (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we estimate the 
vendor’s timing threshold and her put option value under ambiguity in finite-time as follows (see the proof in 
Appendix B.1): 
𝐹(𝑊(𝑡)) = {
(𝑝𝜑 − 𝜑𝐼 − 𝜆𝑋(𝑡))𝑞 𝑊(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊∗
(𝑝𝜑𝑞 − 𝜑𝐼𝑞 −𝑊∗𝑞) (
𝑊(𝑡)
𝑊∗
)
𝛽
𝑊(𝑡) > 𝑊∗
                                   (8) 
where 𝑊∗  is the vendor’s variable cost trigger 𝑊∗ =
𝛽
𝛽−1
(𝑝𝜑 − 𝜑𝐼) and the ambiguity-adjusted option 
value parameter 𝛽 =
1
2
−
𝜇+𝜅𝜎
𝜎2
− 𝜒 < 0, 𝜒 = √(
1
2
−
𝜇+𝜅𝜎
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
.  
Under the real options lens, if 𝑊(𝑡0)  is smaller than 𝑊
∗  it is optimal to start the outsourcing 
arrangement, otherwise the vendor should wait. Since the contract must be exercised at 𝑡0, the vendor needs 
to be compensated for the opportunity cost of waiting and potential loss in option value. Rearranging 
𝑊(𝑡0) ≤ 𝑊
∗, the vendor’s price satisfies the following condition:  
𝑝 ≥ 𝑝(𝑡0) =
𝛽 − 1
𝛽
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0)
𝜑
+ 𝐼
                     
                                 (9) 
where 𝑝(𝑡0) denotes the vendor’s maxmin-based lowest offer price or threshold for the fixed outsourcing 
timing 𝑡0.  
Eq. (9) ensures that it is attractive for the vendor to accept the outsourcing contract at time 𝑡0. The 
vendor’s price resulting from real options effects 𝑝(𝑡0) is higher than its counterpart under the standard NPV 
approach 𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0)
𝜑
+ 𝐼 when option value is neglected. If the ambiguity averse vendor is not ready to 
undertake the outsourcing contract at time 𝑡0, 𝑝(𝑡0) may compensate for the client’s hurriedness.  
The client’s utility comprises his revenues, costs and volume-based learning effects. Let 𝑃𝑐 denote the 
product’s selling price. 𝑃𝑐 > 𝑀 and 𝑃𝑐 > 𝐼 for the problem to be economically meaningful. The term 𝑃𝑐𝜑𝑄 
is the client’s total revenues. His in-house costs over 𝐷 is (𝜑𝑀 +𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡))(𝑄 − 𝑞), where 𝜑𝑀 and 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡) 
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are the expected values of the client’s fixed costs and variable costs from in-house operations.  
Following Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) and Moretto and Rossini (2012), there is an organizational 
redesign cost for the client 
𝐾
2
(
𝑞
𝑄
)
2
. 𝐾 > 0 is a scaling factor indicating the degree of organizational redesign. 
The client’s problem is to choose the outsourcing quantity with the highest utility: 
max
𝑞
𝑈(𝑞) = 𝑃𝐶𝜑𝑄 − (𝜑𝑀 +𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡))(𝑄 − 𝑞) − 𝑝(𝑡0)𝜑𝑞 −
𝐾
2
(
𝑞
𝑄
)
2
+ 𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝑞)
𝛾 + 𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉
 
   (10) 
s. t. 0 < 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄 
 
                                                                    (11) 
Condition (11) means the client’s outsourcing quantity 𝑞 should be greater than zero and smaller than or 
equal to his total demand. The optimization problem for the client is a non-linear function of outsourcing 
quantity 𝑞 . We assume 𝑈(𝑞∗) ≥ 0  to ensure the client can implement outsourcing. Let ?̃? =
𝑄2
(𝑄−𝜛)
[𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝜉−1 − 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 + 𝜑𝑀 − 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0)], where 𝜛 denotes a sufficiently small positive 
constant. We use the Karush-Kuhn–Tucker-conditions to obtain the client’s optimal outsourcing quantity as 
shown in Theorem 1 (see the proof in Appendix B.2).  
Theorem 1  
Suppose the organizational cost 𝐾 > ?̃? and 𝑈(𝑞∗) ≥ 0. If 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) < 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) < 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), the optimal 
partial outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗ is a solution to:  
       𝜑𝑀 +𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) −
𝛽 − 1
𝛽
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝐼 −
𝐾
𝑄
(
𝑞
𝑄
) − 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝑞)
𝛾−1 + 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉−1 = 0  
 
              (12)  
𝑞∗ is an interior solution that maximizes the client’s objective value in our setting. When 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) > 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), 
the client goes for full outsourcing. Here 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) = 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝑀 +
𝐾𝜛
𝑄2
+ 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝛾−1 −
𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝜛
𝜉−1  and 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) = 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝑀 +
𝐾
𝑄2
(𝑄 − 𝜛) + 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝜉−1 . 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) 
and 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) are lower and upper limits of the client’s in-house variable costs.  
Theorem 1 indicates that depending on the relationships among 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0), its lower limit 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) and 
upper limit 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), there are two outsourcing strategies. Note 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) also incorporates the trust factor 𝛿. 
If the client believes his variable costs of in-house operation is moderate such that 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) < 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) <
𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), he will opt for partial outsourcing. The condition 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) > 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) ensures that the client can 
save costs through outsourcing. In the presence of high variable costs 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) ≥ 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), it is optimal for 
the client to fully outsource. Moreover, the client will keep all activities in-house for low variable costs 
(𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) ≤ 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0)). The assumption of 𝐾 > ?̃? is equivalent to 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) > 0. Theorem 1 also implies that 
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the lower and upper limits of the client’s in-house variable costs are sensitive to the vendor’s minimum price 
𝑝(𝑡0) which accounts for ambiguity. If the client focuses on cost reduction only and overlooks volume-based 
learning effects, we obtain Corollary 1.  
Corollary 1   
Let 𝑓𝐼𝐻 = 𝑓𝑂𝐻 = 0 and 𝐾 > 𝜑𝑀𝑄 − 𝑝(𝑡0)𝜑𝑄. Assuming 𝑈(𝑞𝑐
∗) ≥ 0, when 𝑊𝐼𝐻𝐶(𝑡0) < 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) <
𝑊𝐼𝐻𝐶(𝑡0), the client’s optimal partial outsourcing quantity aimed at saving costs is: 𝑞𝑐
∗ =
(𝜑𝑀 +𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) − 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0))
𝑄2
𝐾
.  
When 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) ≥ 𝑊𝐼𝐻𝐶(𝑡0), the client chooses full outsourcing. Here 𝑊𝐼𝐻𝐶(𝑡0) = 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0) +
𝐾
𝑄
− 𝜑𝑀, 
𝑊𝐼𝐻𝐶(𝑡0) = 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝑀. 
Corollary 1 suggests that the client’s partial outsourcing quantity aimed at saving costs increases with the 
client’s trust-embedded forecast 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) and his fixed cost of in-house operations 𝑀. An increase in the 
vendor’s minimum price 𝑝(𝑡0) decreases the client’s partial outsourcing quantity. This accords with the 
intuition: if the vendor asks for a greater price, the client places a smaller order. 
 
3. The effects of ambiguity and trust on partial outsourcing outcomes  
This section describes how partial outsourcing quantity and pricing decisions are affected by the vendor’s 
ambiguity (𝜅-ignorance in the first instance) and the client’s trust factor 𝛿 (see Propositions 1-3). We suppose 
vendor A is located in an outsourcing hub, while Client B is a multinational enterprise with headquarters in 
Europe. Client B has his own subsidiary in A’s market, purchases products from vendor A and sells them to 
European and North American customers. For illustration (Figures 1-3), the vendor and client aim to sign a 
fixed price contract with contract duration 𝐷 = 10 months (e.g., case of household cleaning products).7 
Initial parameters values for the vendor are as follows: the discount rate 𝑟 = 0.06, her fixed cost 𝐼 = 1 $/unit，
variable cost 𝑋(0) = 10 $/unit, the objective drift rate 𝜇 = 0.02 , the volatility 𝜎 = 0.05 . We set the 
initial/base level of ambiguity to 𝜅 = 0.2, hence the drift rate varies from 0.01 to 0.03. The other parameter 
values are as follows: total demand 𝑄 = 100 000 units per month, the organizational redesign cost 𝐾 =
                                                             
7 Household cleaning products are subject to high raw material price volatility (i.e., primary and intermediate petrochemicals). 
As monthly data is publically available and suppliers and clients can adjust supply prices and order quantities on a regular 
basis, a monthly frequency can be used to model related variable costs. 
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1500 000 dollars, the client’s fixed cost 𝑀 = 1.2 $/unit，parameters for volume-based learning effects 𝛾 =
𝜉 = 0.5, 𝑓𝐼𝐻 = 𝑓𝑂𝐻 = 8.5. Let 𝜋 denote the variable cost-saving index, where 𝜋 = 𝜌(𝛿) −
𝛽−1
𝛽
. 
Proposition 1. The effect of vendor’s ambiguity on the client’s outsourcing quantity 
When the variable cost-saving index 𝜋 ≥ 0, the client’s partial outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗ increases with 
ambiguity 𝜅. 
 If 𝜋 < 0, the relationship between 𝑞∗ and 𝜅 is equivocal as follows: 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝜋 ⋛
𝜆
𝜎𝛽𝜒𝜀𝜆
, where 
𝜀𝜆 = 𝜎
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
ℎ2
. 
Proposition 1 implies the client’s partial outsourcing quantity is increasing with the vendor’s ambiguity 
if the variable cost-saving index 𝜋 is greater than zero (see the proof in Appendix B3). The positive cost-
saving index suggests that the client can reduce costs through outsourcing and the vendor has a variable cost 
advantage. This advantage appears to be more significant, or is inflated, with higher ambiguity or pessimism 
from the vendor. Figure 1 illustrates such dynamics for different trust levels. Note 𝜋 incorporates trust factor 
𝛿, the ratios 𝜌𝑉 and 𝜌𝐼𝐻 and the vendor’s judgment (i.e., ambiguity 𝜅, growth rate 𝜇 and volatility 𝜎). 
This means that if made aware of the vendor’s ambiguity, the client needs to re-evaluate the quality of the 
shared information forecasts and revisit whether he should really increase his outsourcing quantity or not.8 
Not doing so can result in over-commitment to outsourcing when the vendor’s ambiguity is high. When 
outsourcing is aimed at saving costs, the vendor’s ambiguity can be a source of hidden costs for the client. 
Recall that 
𝑑𝑞*
𝑑𝜅
=
𝜋𝜀𝜆𝑋(𝑡0)
𝛣⏟    
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0)
−𝛽𝜎𝜒𝛣⏟  
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
, 𝛣 > 0, 𝜀𝜆 > 0 and 𝛽 < 0 in Appendix B.3. 
The first term in the bracket is the present value effect and the second term is the option value effect 
(Trojanowska and Kort, 2010). If 𝜋 is negative, the first term decreases with 𝜅 while the second term 
increases with 𝜅. This creates an equivocal and non-linear relationship between ambiguity and quantity when 
outsourcing is not driven by cost-saving considerations. 
                                                             
8 To minimize the risk of operational failure from the vendor and not over-commit to outsourcing, the client can place the order in 
stages and in a contingent manner or simply switch to a less ambiguity prone vendor.   
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Figure 1. Vendor ambiguity versus client partial outsourcing quantity 
𝜋 > 0, 𝜌𝐼𝐻 = 1, 𝐴 = 1, 𝜌𝑉 = 1.25.  
 
Proposition 2. The effect of trust on the client’s outsourcing quantity  
When 𝐴 > 0 , the partial outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗  increases with the trust factor 𝛿  if 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅0  and 
𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 , and decreases with 𝛿  if (i) 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻 ; (ii) 𝜅 < 𝜅0  and 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 . That 
is:  {
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜅 < 𝜅0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 or if  𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
, where 𝜅0  is the solution to: 
𝐴
(𝜌𝑉−𝜌𝐼𝐻)𝑋(𝑡0)
−
1−𝑒−(𝑟−𝜇−𝜅𝜎)𝐷
𝑟−𝜇−𝜅𝜎
= 0. 
When 𝐴 = 0, the partial outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗ increases (independently of 𝜅-ignorance) with the 
trust factor 𝛿  if 𝜌𝑉 ≥ 𝜌𝐼𝐻  and decreases with 𝛿 if  𝜌𝑉 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻, that is: {
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜌𝑉 ≥ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜌𝑉 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻
. 
When the fixed component 𝐴 is greater than zero, the client adjusts his outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗ non-
monotonically based on the vendor’s ambiguity and the relationship between the two forecast ratios (see the 
proof in Appendix B3). If the vendor’s report 𝜌𝑉𝑊(𝑡0) is greater than the client’s forecast 𝜌𝐼𝐻𝑊(𝑡0) and 
𝐴 > 0, the vendor is more likely to inflate her variable cost advantage. In this situation, the vendor’s ambiguity 
will moderate the relationship between trust and outsourcing quantity. More specifically, a more trustful client 
would opt for a smaller (an even greater) outsourcing quantity when the vendor’s ambiguity is low 𝜅 < 𝜅0 
(high 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅0) (see Figure 2a). Ambiguity effects matter more when the ambiguous vendor communicates a 
variable cost advantage. If 𝜌𝑉 is smaller than 𝜌𝐼𝐻, the vendor is less likely to have a variable cost advantage. 
In this case, the client trusts the vendor and places a lower order (see Figure 2b).  
 
15 
 
    
  
Figure 2. Client trust versus partial outsourcing quantity 
𝜌𝐼𝐻 = 1.1 in Fig. 2. 𝜌𝑉 = 1.123 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 and 𝜌𝑉 = 1 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻 in Figs. 2a and 2b, respectively, where 𝐴 = 2. In Fig. 2c, 𝐴 = 0, 
𝜌𝑉 = 1.05 or 1.18. 
When 𝐴 = 0, more trust can either increase or decrease the client’s outsourcing quantity as shown in 
Figure 2c. Its influence depends on the difference between 𝜌𝑉  and 𝜌𝐼𝐻 . Higher trust levels decrease the 
client’s outsourcing quantity when the vendor is less likely to communicate a variable cost advantage. 
Ambiguity does not moderate the relationship between trust and outsourcing quantity if 𝐴 = 0 (e.g., the 
client does not have raw material in stock). Proposition 2 is unchanged with or without volume-based learning 
effects. The vendor’s and client’s utilities are also non-monotonic with respect to trust. This is caused by the 
non-linear association between trust and the client’s “optimal” partial outsourcing quantity. 
Contract duration is also an important dimension of outsourcing. Prior literature such as Jiang et al. (2008), 
Shi and Feng (2016) and Shi (2016) discusses how the time horizon for outsourcing affects the vendor’s 
acceptance decision and commitment level under risk. In particular, Shi and Feng (2016) find there is a 
contract trigger that induces a non-monotonic relationship between the supplier’s timing threshold and 
contract duration. We add to these prior studies by considering the effect of ambiguity on the vendor’s pricing 
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for long-term and short-term contracts in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. The effect of ambiguity on the vendor’s pricing 
The vendor’s lowest offer price 𝑝(𝑡0) increases with ambiguity 𝜅 if 𝐷 ≥ 𝐷𝑉 and decreases with 𝜅  if 
𝐷 < 𝐷𝑉 , that is: {
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
≥ 0 if 𝐷 ≥ 𝐷𝑉
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
< 0 if 𝐷 < 𝐷𝑉
, where the contract duration threshold 𝐷𝑉  is a solution to: 
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
𝜆
+
ℎ2
(𝛽−1)𝜎2χ
= 0, ℎ = 𝑟 − 𝜇 − 𝜅𝜎, 𝜒 = √(
1
2
−
𝜇+𝜅𝜎
𝜎2
)2 +
2𝑟
𝜎2
.  
Proposition 3 indicates that an increase in ambiguity results in a higher vendor’s minimum price 𝑝(𝑡0) 
when 𝐷 ≥ 𝐷𝑉 (long-term contract) and a lower vendor’s price when 𝐷 < 𝐷𝑉 (short-term contract) (see the 
proof in Appendix B3). This is in line with evidence of vendors sometimes preferring short-term outsourcing 
contracts over long-term ones (i.e., short-termism bias) when faced with high cost uncertainty. For long-term 
contracts, the vendor demands a higher price because of her ambiguity aversion. This results from the vendor’s 
short-termist predisposition and the perception or bias that some of her idiosyncratic uncertainty will resolve 
itself faster in short-term arrangements. As ambiguity increases, 𝑝(𝜇=0) will first decrease then increase as 
depicted in Figure 3a. This is because 𝐷𝑉(𝜇=0) is first greater than 𝐷 and then smaller than 𝐷 (see Figure 
3b where 𝐷 = 10 months). The other lines in Figure 3a are increasing in ambiguity since 𝐷 is greater than 
the contract duration thresholds. The relationship between ambiguity and the price trigger is, therefore, 
conditional on contract duration. This adds to extant real options research on the equivocal relationship 
between ambiguity and the investment trigger under 𝜅-ignorance in finite-time (see e.g., Nishimura and Ozaki 
2007; Trojanowska and Kort, 2010). We show that the existence of a positive association is conditional on 
contract duration. In terms of practical implications, the client will be charged a higher price with higher 
ambiguity from the vendor if he favors long-term contracts. This once again points to the value of sequencing 
outsourcing commitment into contingent stages as a way of mitigating the hidden costs associated with the 
vendor’s pricing strategy. 
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Figure 3. Vendor ambiguity versus lowest offer price 
 
Having examined how ambiguity and trust affect outsourcing quantity and price under the multiple-priors 
specification, we revisit our propositions under Choquet ambiguity and rank-dependent probability weighting. 
This is justified by the fact that the maxmin multiple-priors or worst-case ambiguity ignores differences in 
ambiguity preferences (e.g., ambiguity-seeking) and sensitivity to likelihood (see Abdellaoui et al., 2011; 
Baillon et al., 2017). Also, the multiple-priors ambiguity specification should correspond to cases where 
vendors feel less competent and less confident/knowledgeable about performing new or untested outsourcing 
tasks (e.g., advanced IT outsourcing or outsourcing of complex corporate functions), while the Choquet 
specification should match cases with more confident, experienced and specialized vendors (e.g., outsourcing 
of financial services plans and outsourcing in knowledge-intensive industries). We use the notion of c-
ignorance to differentiate between ambiguity-seeking and aversion and study the influence of Choquet 
ambiguity on outsourcing pricing and quantity. Table 2 reports our findings (the risk case is also shown for 
comparison). In the Choquet setting, the vendor’s variable cost evolves according to the Choquet–Brownian 
motion developed by Kast and Lapied (2010) and Kast et al. (2014): 
                                               𝑑𝑋(𝑡) = (𝜇 + 𝑚𝜎)𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑠𝜎𝑋(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡                                       
 
                          (13)  
where the (range of) drift and volatility terms are subjectively evaluated as 𝜇 + 𝑚𝜎 and 𝑠𝜎.  𝑚=2𝑐 − 1, 
𝑠2 = 4𝑐(1 − 𝑐), 0 < 𝑐 < 1,  𝜇 > 0, 𝜎 > 0. Ambiguity affects both the drift and volatility of the Brownian 
motion this time. 𝑐 is a non-additive capacity that captures decision makers’ ambiguity preferences through 
the weights assigned to probabilities of up and down movements. When 𝑐 > 0.5 (𝑐 < 0.5), the vendor is 
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ambiguity-seeking (averse) and, in our setting, is bullish (bearish) about the cost-saving benefits of 
outsourcing.9  
We find that when rank-dependent probability weighting - aka Choquet ambiguity - is considered, the 
non-linear effects of ambiguity on outsourcing quantity are exacerbated by heterogeneity in ambiguity 
preferences. The client’s outsourcing quantity tends to increase (decrease) with increasing ambiguity-seeking 
(aversion: 𝑐 < 0.5) from the vendor if the cost-saving index is positive (negative and the risk-return ratio 
𝑧(𝑐) > 0). Also, the vendor’s price not only increases (decreases) with increasing ambiguity-seeking 𝑐 > 0.5 
for long-term (short-term) contracts, but also with aversion to ambiguity when the risk-return relation 𝑧(𝑐) 
is positive. This highlights the importance of probability weighting and separating ambiguity preferences from 
ambiguity in decision-making models. Trust dynamics are generally maintained under Choquet ambiguity.  
Table 2 summarizes the effects of risk, 𝜅 -ignorance, Choquet ambiguity and trust on outsourcing 
outcomes for comparison (see proofs in Appendix C). Compared to the unequivocal relationship between risk 
and outsourcing quantity documented in the normative real options literature, both 𝜅-ignorance and Choquet 
ambiguity alter the outsourcing quantity non-linearly and conditionally. The same holds for the associations 
between price and risk vs. price and ambiguity (due to the role of contract duration in the ambiguous settings). 
Trust effects interact with ambiguity effects only when the vendor communicates a variable cost advantage or 
inflates her forecasts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 𝑐 = 0.5 reduces to the classical geometric Brownian motion under risk or uncertainty-neutrality. 
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Table 2. Comparing risk versus ambiguity specifications 
with risk and trust with multiple-priors 
ambiguity and trust  
with Choquet ambiguity and trust  
 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
*
𝑑𝜎
< 0 
If 𝜋 ≥ 0, 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
> 0;  
If 𝜋 < 0,
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
⋛0 ⇔ 𝜋⋛
𝜆
𝜎𝛽𝜒𝜀𝜆
,  
where 𝜋=𝜌(𝛿) −
𝛽−1
𝛽
.  
{
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
> 0 if 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) > 0, 𝑐 ≥ 0.5 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
< 0 if 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) ≤ 0, 𝑐 < 0.5 and 𝑧(𝑐) > 0
. 
In the other cases, 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿)⋛
𝜂𝜀𝛼
𝛼2𝜀𝜂
. 
(1) For 𝐴 > 0, 
{
 
 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
*
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞𝑅
*
𝑑𝛿
< 0
if 𝜇 < 𝜇0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
or if 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
, 
where 𝜇0 is the solution of  
1−𝑒−(𝑟−𝜇)𝐷
𝑟−𝜇
− 𝑅 = 0. 
(2) If 𝐴 = 0,  
{
𝑑𝑞𝑅
*
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜌𝑉 ≥ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞𝑅
*
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜌𝑉 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻
. 
(1) For 𝐴 > 0, 
{
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0
if 𝜅 < 𝜅0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
or if 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
, 
where 𝜅0  is the solution of 
1−𝑒−(𝑟−𝜇−𝜅𝜎)𝐷
𝑟−𝜇−𝜅𝜎
− 𝑅 = 0. 
(2) When 𝐴 = 0, 
{
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜌𝑉 ≥ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜌𝑉 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻
. 
(1) For 𝐴 > 0, {
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0
if 𝑐 < 𝑐0, 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻
or if 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
, 
where 𝑐0  is the solution of       
1−𝑒−[𝑟−(𝜇+(2𝑐−1)𝜎)]𝐷
𝑟−(𝜇+(2𝑐−1)𝜎)
−𝑅 = 0. 
(2) When 𝐴 = 0, {
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
*
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 𝜌𝑉 ≥ 𝜌𝐼𝐻
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
*
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜌𝑉 < 𝜌𝐼𝐻
. 
 
𝜕𝑝𝑅(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜎
> 0 
If 𝐷 ≥ 𝐷𝑉, 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
≥ 0. 
Otherwise, 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
< 0,  
where 𝐷𝑉 is a solution to: 
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
𝜆
+
ℎ2
(𝛽−1)𝜎2χ
= 0. 
{
 
 𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
> 0
if 𝑐 < 0.5 and 𝑧(𝑐) > 0 
or if 𝑐 ≥ 0.5 and 𝐷 > 𝐷𝐶𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
< 0 if 𝑐 ≥ 0.5 and 𝐷 < 𝐷𝐶𝐴
. 
If 𝑐 < 0.5 and 𝑧(𝑐) ≤ 0, 
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝜀𝛼 ⋛
(𝛼 − 𝛼2)
𝜀𝜂
𝜂
. 𝐷𝐶𝐴 is a solution to (𝛼
2 −
𝛼) 𝜀𝜂 𝜂⁄ + 𝜀𝛼 = 0. 
where 𝑅 =
𝐴
(𝜌𝑉−𝜌𝐼𝐻)𝑋(𝑡0)
, 𝜀𝜆 = 𝜎
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
ℎ2
, 𝜀𝜂 = 2𝑒
−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷𝜎
𝑒(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷−1
(𝑟−?̃?)2
,  𝑧(𝑐) = 𝜇(1 − 2𝑐) − 𝜎[2(𝑐 − 0.5)2 + 0.5], 
𝜀𝛼 =
−𝛼𝑧(𝑐)+𝑟(1−2𝑐)
4𝜎2𝑐2(1−𝑐)2√𝜒𝐶𝐴
2 +
2𝑟
𝑠2𝜎2
, ?̃?=𝜇 + (2𝑐 − 1)𝜎, 𝛼=𝜒𝐶𝐴 − √𝜒𝐶𝐴
2 +
2𝑟
𝑠2𝜎2
< 0, 𝜒𝐶𝐴=
1
2
−
?̃?
𝑠2𝜎2
.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose a behavioral real options model for partial outsourcing that integrates ambiguity 
in costs, trust in cost information sharing and volume-based learning to explain some of the hidden costs of 
outsourcing. The effects of maxmin ambiguity and trust on partial outsourcing outcomes are studied. First, we 
find that higher 𝜅-ignorance from the vendor increases the client’s outsourcing quantity when the cost-saving 
index is positive but does not necessarily increase the vendor’s lowest offer price. The vendor’s lowest offer 
price increases (decreases) with 𝜅-ignorance for long-term (short-term) contracts only. Second, we show that 
trust affects partial outsourcing quantities in non-monotonic ways. Higher trust can encourage (reduce) 
outsourcing if the vendor’s forecast is higher (lower) than the client’s. This relationship is, however, likely to 
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be moderated by 𝜅-ignorance when the vendor exaggerates her cost advantages. Finally, compared with the 
effects of 𝜅-ignorance, the relationships between Choquet ambiguity and the corresponding outsourcing 
outcomes are more complex and subtle because ambiguity preferences (seeking vs. aversion) and probabilistic 
sophistication come into play. In the absence of ambiguity, the client’s outsourcing quantity unequivocally 
decreases with risk while the vendor’s lowest price increases with volatility. Our behavioral real options model 
shows that ambiguity, trust and ambiguity preferences affect outsourcing outcomes in many different ways 
and that volatility is only part of the uncertainty story. The omission of behavioral factors from normative or 
rational option valuation models are part of the reason why real options theory predictions for outsourcing do 
not fully hold in practice (see e.g., Musteen, 2016; Choi et al., 2017). Our modeling insights also help to clarify 
recurrent biases in outsourcing (e.g., over-commitment and short-termism) and contribute to understanding 
some of the cost determinants of outsourcing failure. In terms of practical implications, our findings provide 
guidance on how clients and vendors behave when faced with incomplete and asymmetric information, and 
point to the need to embed flexibility/performance and exit clauses in outsourcing contracts and sequence 
commitment into contingent stages as ways of dealing with ambiguity and mitigating some of the hidden costs 
of outsourcing.   
Compared with extant studies under risk, the real options model we propose should be more reflective of 
reality because it considers the behavior and potential biases of vendors and clients - through ambiguity and 
trust - in outsourcing relationships and explains some of the hidden and unexpected costs of outsourcing. Our 
work can be extended in several directions. The client’s selling price and total demand are assumed to be 
constant. Such factors can be uncertain and affected by product and service quality. Our framework is 
restricted to interactions between a vendor and client. Theoretical extensions could account for multiple 
vendors and clients and incorporate competition or learning-by-doing in the various dynamics. The role of 
cultural attributes can also be examined given the cultural differences between clients and vendors in 
international outsourcing. Finally, it would be interesting to empirically validate our research predictions using 
a global outsourcing dataset of clients and vendors. 
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Appendix A.    
Table A1. Key notation 
𝑄 Total demand amount. 
𝐷 Contract duration, 𝐷 > 0.  
𝐼, 𝑀 The vendor’s and client’s fixed costs. 
𝑃𝐶 The client’s selling price, 𝑃𝐶 > 𝑀, 𝑃𝐶 > 𝐼. 
𝑋(𝑡) 𝑋(𝑡) denotes the vendor’s variable costs. 
𝑊(𝑡) 
The maxmin expected value of 𝑋(𝑡). 𝑊(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑋(𝑡). The ambiguity multiplier          
𝜆 = (1 − 𝑒−ℎ𝐷)/ℎ，ℎ = 𝑟 − 𝜇 − 𝜅𝜎. 
𝜇, 𝜎 
𝜇 and 𝜎 denote the drift and volatility of 𝑋(𝑡) before considering ambiguity, 
𝜎 > 0. 
𝜅 𝜅 reflects decision maker’s ambiguity about the drift rate.   
𝛿 𝛿 describes the extent to which the client trusts the vendor’s reported information. 
𝜌𝐼𝐻, 𝜌𝑉 
𝜌𝐼𝐻(𝜌𝑉 ,) is the ratio of the client’s forecast (vendor’s report) to the vendor’s variable cost. 
The weighted ratio: 𝜌(𝛿) = 𝛿𝜌𝑉 + (1 − 𝛿)𝜌𝐼𝐻. 
𝐴 The client’s judgment about the fixed component of his variable costs. 
𝛽 The option value parameter 𝛽 < 0. 
𝜋(𝛿) Variable cost-saving index 𝜋(𝛿) = 𝜌(𝛿) − (𝛽 − 1)/𝛽. 
𝑟 Discount rate. 
𝜑 The present value multiplier over the contract duration 𝐷. 𝜑 = (1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝐷)/𝑟. 
𝐾 
Organizational cost reflecting the convex relationship between outsourcing proportion and 
the costs of redesigning the system. It is an irreversible lump sum payment. 
𝑓𝐼𝐻 , 𝑓𝑂𝐻  
Scaling factors of the client’s volume-based benefits of in-house operation and outsourcing 
per unit time. They depend on volume-based learning effects. 
𝛾, 𝜉 
Rate of diminishing returns of volume-based learning with respect to in-house vs. 
outsourced operations 𝛾, 𝜉 ∈ (0,1). 
 
Appendix B.  
Appendix B.1. The vendor’s option value 
Let 𝑌(𝑡) = 𝑊(𝑡)𝑞. According to Eq. (2), the vendor’s total variable cost 𝑌(𝑡) follows: 𝑑𝑌(𝑡) = (𝜇 −
𝜎𝜃𝑡)𝑌(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌(𝑡)𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝜃. In the continuation region, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐸
𝜃∈[−𝜅, 𝜅]
𝑄𝜃[𝑑𝐹|ℱ𝑡] = 𝑟𝐹(𝑌(𝑡))𝑑𝑡. Suppose that 𝐹 is 
twice differentiable in the continuation region and 𝐹′ = 𝜕𝐹 𝜕⁄ 𝑌(𝑡) < 0. The expectation of 𝑑𝐹  can be 
written as (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007; Trojanowska and Kort, 2010): 
min𝐸
𝜃∈[−𝜅, 𝜅]
𝑄𝜃[𝑑𝐹|ℱ𝑡]=
1
2
𝜎2(𝑌(𝑡))2𝐹″𝑑𝑡+(𝜇 + 𝜅𝜎)𝑌(𝑡)𝐹′𝑑𝑡, where 𝐹″ = 𝜕2𝐹 𝜕⁄ (𝑌(𝑡))2. 
From the Bellman equation, we get 
1
2
𝜎2(𝑌(𝑡))
2
𝐹″+(𝜇 + 𝜅𝜎)𝑌(𝑡)𝐹′ − 𝑟𝐹(𝑌(𝑡)) = 0. The vendor’s 
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option value 𝐹(𝑌(𝑡)) should satisfy the following value matching, smooth-pasting and barrier conditions: 
𝐹(𝑌∗)=𝑝𝜑𝑞 − 𝐼𝜑𝑞 − 𝑌∗, 𝐹′(𝑌∗)=− 1, 𝐹(∞) = 0. Thus, we obtain the Eq. (8). 
Appendix B.2. Proof of Theorem 1    
Since 𝜉 < 1  and 𝛾 < 1 , 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝑞2
< 0 .The client’s objective function is strictly concave in 𝑞 . Let         
𝐿=𝑃𝐶𝜑𝑄 − (𝜑𝑀+𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0))(𝑄 − 𝑞) − 𝑝(𝑡0)𝜑𝑞 −
𝐾
2
(
𝑞
𝑄
)2+𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝑞)
𝛾+𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉+𝑦1𝑞 + 𝑦2(𝑄 − 𝑞)  denote 
the Lagrangian of the client’s problem. The complementary slackness conditions are (Chiang and Wainwright, 
2005):  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
≤ 0 , 𝑞 ≥ 0 , 𝑞
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
= 0 ; 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦1
≥ 0 , 𝑦1 ≥ 0 , 𝑦1
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦1
= 0 ;  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦2
≥ 0 , 𝑦2 ≥ 0 , 𝑦2
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦2
= 0. 
The first order derivative of 𝐿 with respect to 𝑞 is:  
𝑙(𝑞)=
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
=𝜑𝑀+𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) −
𝛽 − 1
𝛽
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝐼 −
𝐾
𝑄
(
𝑞
𝑄
) − 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝑞)
𝛾−1+𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉−1+𝑦1 − 𝑦2 
If 𝑦1 = 0 and 𝑦2 = 0, 𝑞
∗ is the solution of 𝑙(𝑞) = 0. 𝜉, 𝛾 ∈ (0,1). 𝑙(𝑞) goes to positive (negative) 
infinity if 𝑞 approaches 0 (𝑄). Let 𝜛 denote a sufficiently small positive constant, where 𝜛 < 𝑄 −𝜛. 
From 
𝜕2𝐿
𝜕𝑞2
< 0, we know that 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
= 0  exists between 𝑞 ∈ (𝜛,𝑄 − 𝜛) if 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
|
𝑞=𝜛
> 0 and 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
|
𝑞=𝑄−𝜛
< 0. 
This implies the interior solution exists if: 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) > 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) = 𝜑(𝑝(𝑡0) − 𝑀) +
𝐾𝜛
𝑄2
+ 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 −
𝜛)𝛾−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝜛
𝜉−1  and  𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) < ?̅?𝐼𝐻(𝑡0)=𝜑(𝑝(𝑡0) − 𝑀) +
𝐾
𝑄2
(𝑄 − 𝜛) + 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 −
𝜛)𝜉−1 . As 𝜉, 𝛾 ∈ (0,1)  and ?̅?𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) −𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0)=
𝐾
𝑄
(
𝑄−2𝜛
𝑄
) + 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝜛
𝛾−1 − (𝑄 −𝜛)𝛾−1) +
𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝜛
𝜉−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝜉−1 > 0 . To ensure ?̅?𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) > 0 , we require 𝐾 > ?̃? =
𝑄2
(𝑄−𝜛)
[𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 −
𝜛)𝜉−1 − 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 + 𝜑𝑀 − 𝜑𝑝(𝑡0)].  
If 𝑦1 > 0 and 𝑦2 = 0, 𝑞 = 0 and 𝑙(𝑞) ≤ 0. This means 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) ≤ 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0). If 𝑦1 = 0 and 𝑦2 > 0, 
we obtain 𝑞 = 𝑄 and 𝑊𝐼𝐻
𝑇 (𝑡0) ≥ ?̅?𝐼𝐻(𝑡0). If 𝑦1 > 0 and 𝑦2 > 0, the optimal solution does not exist. This 
leads to Theorem 1. 
Appendix B.3. Proofs of Propositions 1-3 
Proposition 1 
The first order derivative of partial outsourcing quantity 𝑞∗ with respect to 𝜅 follows: 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
=
𝜀𝜆
𝛣
(𝜋 −
𝜆
𝜎𝛽𝜒𝜀𝜆
)𝑋(𝑡0), where 𝜀𝜆 =
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜅
= 𝜎
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
ℎ2
> 0, 𝛽 < 0, 𝜋 = 𝜌(𝛿) −
𝛽−1
𝛽
, 𝛣 =
𝐾
𝑄2
+ 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 −
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𝑞)𝛾−2+𝜉(1 − 𝜉)𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉−2 > 0 , 𝛾 < 1 , 𝜉 < 1 . Then, 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
> 0  if 𝜋 ≥ 0 . If 𝜋 < 0 , 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝜅
⋛ 0 ⇔ 𝜋 ⋛
𝜆
𝜎𝛽𝜒𝜀𝜆
. 
 
Proposition 2 
From Theorem 1, 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
=
1
𝛣
[(𝜌𝑉 − 𝜌𝐼𝐻)𝜆𝑋(𝑡0) − 𝐴]. Recall 𝐵 > 0. If 𝐴 = 0, the sign of 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
 depends on 
𝜌𝑉 − 𝜌𝐼𝐻 . When 𝐴 > 0 and 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻 , 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0. When 𝐴 > 0 and 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 , we know that 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0 if 
𝜆 ≥ 𝑅  and 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜆 < 𝑅 , where 𝑅 =
𝐴
(𝜌𝑉−𝜌𝐼𝐻)𝑋(𝑡0)
.  Let 𝜅0  denote the solution to 𝑅 − 𝜆 = 0. As 
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜅
> 0 , we know that 𝜆 ≥ 𝑅   is equivalent to 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅0  and 𝜆 < 𝑅  means 𝜅 < 𝜅0 . Thus we obtain 
proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 3 
We compute the derivative of the vendor’s lowest offer price 𝑝(𝑡0) with respect to 𝜅  as follows: 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
=
𝜆𝑋(𝑡0)(1−𝛽)𝜎
−𝛽𝜑ℎ2
(?̂?+
ℎ2
(𝛽−1)𝜎2𝜒
), where ?̂?=
1−𝑒−ℎ𝐷(1+ℎ𝐷)
𝜆
. As ?̂? is a function of contract duration 𝐷, we 
have 
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝐷
= 𝑒−ℎ𝐷
𝑒−ℎ𝐷−(1−ℎ𝐷)
𝜆2
> 0. Recall 𝜆 > 0 and 𝛽 < 0. When ?̂? ≥
ℎ2
(1−𝛽)𝜎2𝜒
, we have 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
≥ 0. If 
?̂? <
ℎ2
(1−𝛽)𝜎2𝜒
, we get 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
< 0. Let 𝐷𝑉 denote the solution of ?̂? +
ℎ2
(𝛽−1)𝜎2χ
= 0. We get 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
≥ 0 if 𝐷 ≥
𝐷𝑉 and 
𝜕𝑝(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜅
< 0  if 𝐷 < 𝐷𝑉.  
 
Appendix C. The effects of Choquet ambiguity and trust on partial outsourcing  
When 𝜅 = 0 , we use the subscript R to denote results under risk (no ambiguity): 𝛽𝑅 =
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
−
√(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)2 +
2𝑟
𝜎2
< 0. Note 
𝜕𝛽𝑅
𝜕𝜎
> 0 (Moon et al., 2010). 
𝜕𝑝𝑅(𝑡0)
𝜕𝜎
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
∗
𝑑𝜎
=
−𝜆𝑅𝑋(𝑡0)
(𝛽𝑅)2𝛣
𝜕𝛽𝑅
𝜕𝜎
< 0. For 𝐴 >
0 and 𝜌𝑉 > 𝜌𝐼𝐻 , 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
∗
𝑑𝛿
≥ 0  if 𝜇 ≥ 𝜇0 and 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0 if 𝜇 < 𝜇0; If 𝜌𝑉 ≤ 𝜌𝐼𝐻 , 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
∗
𝑑𝛿
< 0, where 𝜇0 is the 
solution of 
1−𝑒−(𝑟−𝜇)𝐷
𝑟−𝜇
− 𝑅 = 0. If 𝐴 = 0, the sign of 
𝑑𝑞𝑅
∗
𝑑𝛿
 is the same as the sign of 𝜌𝑉 − 𝜌𝐼𝐻. Thus, we 
obtain the first column in Table 2.  
Using a similar logic, the vendor’s lowest offer price under Choquet ambiguity is 𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0) =
𝛼−1
𝛼
𝜂𝑋(𝑡0)
𝜑
+𝐼, 
where the subscript CA denotes Choquet ambiguity, 𝛼=𝜒𝐶𝐴 −√𝜒𝐶𝐴
2 +
2𝑟
𝑠2𝜎2
< 0 ,  𝜒𝐶𝐴=
1
2
−
?̃?
𝑠2𝜎2
, 𝜇=𝜇 + 𝑚𝜎 , 
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𝜂 = (1 − 𝑒−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷) (𝑟 − 𝜇)⁄ .  
Suppose 𝐾 > ?̃?𝐶𝐴 and 𝑈(𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗ ) ≥ 0. If 𝑊𝐼𝐻(𝑡0) < 𝑊𝐶𝐴
𝑇 (𝑡0) < ?̅?𝐼𝐻(𝑡0), the optimal partial outsourcing 
quantity under Choquet ambiguity 𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗  is a solution to: 𝜑𝑀+𝑊𝐶𝐴
𝑇 (𝑡0) −
𝛼−1
𝛼
𝜂𝑋(𝑡0) − 𝜑𝐼 −
𝐾
𝑄
(
𝑞
𝑄
) −
𝜑𝛾𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝑞)
𝛾−1+𝜑𝜉𝑓𝑂𝐻𝑞
𝜉−1=0, where 𝑊𝐶𝐴
𝑇 (𝑡0) = (1 − 𝛿)𝐴+𝜌(𝛿)𝜂𝑋(𝑡0), ?̃?𝐶𝐴 =
𝑄2
(𝑄−𝜛)
[𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 −
𝜛)𝜉−1 − 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 + 𝜑𝑀 − 𝜑𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)],  𝑊𝐶𝐴(𝑡0) = 𝜑(𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0) −𝑀) +
𝐾𝜛
𝑄2
+ 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝛾−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻𝜛
𝜉−1, 
?̅?𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)=𝜑(𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0) − 𝑀) +
𝐾
𝑄2
(𝑄 − 𝜛) + 𝛾𝜑𝑓𝐼𝐻𝜛
𝛾−1 − 𝜉𝜑𝑓𝑂𝐻(𝑄 − 𝜛)
𝜉−1. 
Taking the derivative of 𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗  with respect to 𝑐 , we get 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
=
𝜀𝜂
𝛣
(𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) −
𝜂𝜀𝛼
𝛼2𝜀𝜂
)𝑋(𝑡0) , where 
𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) = 𝜌(𝛿) −
𝛼−1
𝛼
, 𝜀𝜂 =
𝜕𝜂
𝜕𝑐
= 2𝑒−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷𝜎
𝑒(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷−1
(𝑟−?̃?)2
> 0 , 𝜀𝛼 =
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑐
=
−𝛼𝑧(𝑐)+𝑟(1−2𝑐)
4𝜎2𝑐2(1−𝑐)2√𝜒𝐶𝐴
2 +
2𝑟
𝑠2𝜎2
, 𝐵  is 
defined in Appendix B.3, 𝑧(𝑐) = 𝜇(1 − 2𝑐) − 𝜎[2(𝑐 − 0.5)2 + 0.5]. Then if 𝑐 ≥ 0.5, 𝑧(𝑐) < 0 and 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑐
<
0 . In this case, 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
> 0  if 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) > 0 . If 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) ≤ 0 , 𝑐 < 0.5 and 𝑧(𝑐) > 0 , 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
< 0 . 
Otherwise, 
𝑑𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑐
⋛ 0⇔ 𝜋𝐶𝐴(𝛿) ⋛
𝜂𝜀𝛼
𝛼2𝜀𝜂
. 
The effect of trust on 𝑞𝐶𝐴
∗  is determined using Appendix B.3. The derivative of 𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0) with respect to 
𝑐 is: 
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
=
𝑋(𝑡0)𝜂
𝜑𝛼2
((𝛼2 − 𝛼)
𝜀𝜂
𝜂
+ 𝜀𝛼). If 𝑐 < 0.5 and 𝑧(𝑐), 𝜀𝛼 > 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
> 0. If  𝑐 < 0.5 and 
𝑧(𝑐) ≤ 0, 
∂𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
∂𝑐
⋛ 0⇔ 𝜀𝛼 ⋛ (𝛼 − 𝛼
2)
𝜀𝜂
𝜂
. Let 𝛬 =
𝜀𝜂
𝜂
= 2𝜎
1−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷𝑒−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷−𝑒−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷
(𝑟−?̃?)(1−𝑒−(𝑟−?̃?)𝐷)
. As (𝑟 − 𝜇)𝐷 ≪
1, 
𝜕𝛬
𝜕𝐷
> 0. Let 𝐷𝐶𝐴 denote the solution to: (𝛼
2 − 𝛼)
𝜀𝜂
𝜂
+ 𝜀𝛼 = 0. If 𝑐 ≥ 0.5 and 𝐷 > 𝐷𝐶𝐴, 
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
> 0. 
If 𝑐 ≤ 0.5 and , 
𝜕𝑝𝐶𝐴(𝑡0)
𝜕𝑐
< 0. This leads to the third column in Table 2. 
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